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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the usage of labour market programmes using a matching model
with three stocks - regular employment, labour market programmes, and unemployment.
With the assumptions that a welfare safety net must be in place and that pay on labour
market programmes must be at, or above, some minimum social level, we tind that often
the optimal policy for reducing unemployment in this model is to offer unemployed
workers places on "rejectable" labour market programmes whilst simultaneously lowering
the level of unemployment benefits, possibly to zero. ("Rejectable" labour market
programmes are simply those programmes which are unacceptable to workers in that the
expected lifetime income from remaining unemployed is hi~her than that of being on a
programme.) The unemployed worker will thus still have a safety net in place, since the
programme place offers a wabe above the minimum level, but will reject it in favour of
unemployment. This usage of labour market programmes is the only usage which is
guaranteed free ofcrowding-out problems.
~ Uscful commcnts from Lans Bovcnbcrg, John Driffill, Arllmr van Socst, and Harald Uhlig, arc gratcfully
acknowlcdgcd. A grant from thc Nordic Doctoral Programmc in Economics to prescnt this papcr al rhe




In recent years, there has been much debate on whether labour market programmes~ can
be used to combat unemployment, and their likely impact2. Various models have been
developed to analyse the likely effects of such programmes on unemployment and the
possibility of crowding out of regular employment. All of these models assume that if an
unemployed individual is offered a place on a programme, they will accept it since it
increases expected lifetime income. The general result of many of these models is that
labour market programmes can reduce total unemployment but are likely to crowd out
regular employment. These models also implicitly assume that benefits cannot be reduced
below some minimum level unless a place on a programme is guaranteed. Thus it is
assumed that the unemployed will have some welfare safety net to be able to fall back on,
rather than being thrown into the ravages ofdestitution.
In this paper, we use a matching model in the tradition of Diamond (1981), Mortensen
(1982), Pissarides (l985, 1990), and Holmlund 8c Lindén (1993). The major difference
between this paper and the aforementioned papers is that we allow for the possibility of
offering placements on labour market programmes which are unacceptable to the
unemployed worker, in that the lifetime value to the worker of being unemployed is higher
than if the said worker was on a labour market programme. We refer to these programmes
as "rejectable" labour market programmes. (Note that it is always beneficial to the worker
to accept a regular job.) This allows us to cut unemployment benefits and offer places on
labour market programmes which are rejected in favour of remaining unemployed.
Since it is the unemployed who have the highest search intensity amongst those who are
searching, due to having the time available to search, they have the highest chance of
gaining a regular job. Thus a worker may prefer to be unemployed since they will have a
higher chance ofgaining a regular job. Due to the higher chance of gaining a regular job, it
~"Labour markct programmcs" are simply tlwsc tcmporary mcasures which thc govcrnment creates in an
etl'ort to allcvialc uncmployment. Tlicy include training programmes, tcmporary employmcnt, etc.
' See, for cv~mple, Calmrors ~ L.~ng (1993), Holmlund 8c Lindón (1993), Jackman (1994), t,ayard,
Nickell, á Jackman (1991), Miller (1991), and Miller (1995b).
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is possible that a worker in unemployment will have a higher expected lifetime income
than if that worker were on a labour market programme. Thus the value of being
unemployed can be higher than the value of being on a programme. If we can construct a
situation where it is in the interest of the worker to remain unemployed, despite lower
unemployment benefits than previously (possibly no benefits whatsoever), then we can
crowd in regular employment since the reduction in unemployment benefits will reduce the
wage costs to firms and therefore lower the cost of maintaining a vacancy. Due to the
lower cost ofmaintaining a vacancy, the number of vacancies will increase which will lead
to more matches taking place between firms and workers. Thus we can gain a result where
we have crowded in regular employment at the expense of unemployment, without
removing the welfare safety net.
In this paper, we assume that those workers on labour market programmes are strictly less
productive than those in regular employment. Thus, any crowding out of regular
employment due to the usage of labour market programmes must be viewed with some
caution. Also in this paper, we endogenise the payroll tax to make our analysis more
complete. Whilst the endogenisation of the payroll tax does not affect the comparative
statics of the model, it does allow us to see if the resulting situation is socially acceptable
in that all members of the labour force are receiving a wage, or entitled to benefits, at or
above some minimum level. Should this not be the case, then we consider the situation to
be unworkable. For example, if we simply cut unemployment benefits to below the
minimum social level without providing a guarantee of a place on a labour market
programme with pay at or above the minimum level, then the situation would be
considered socially unacceptable and therefore unworkable. The worker in unemployment
would not have the protection of a welfare safety net, which is considered to be an
essential element of any socially acceptable system. This would be despite the fact that the
comparative statics would show an all round improvement.
This paper takes the following format: Firstly we develop our model, making the
assumptions and framework explicit; then in Section 3 we look at the comparative statics
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of the model; in Section 4, we show how we have endogerused the payroll tax, and the
motivation behind doing so; in Section 5, we undertake some simulations of examples of
the usage of labour market programmes both for the rejectable and the "acceptable" (i.e.
those labour market programmes which do increase the present value of a worker's
lifetime income) cases and show the results; and lastly we provide a conclusion to this
paper.
2 The model
In this paper, we use a matching model where the search process is summarised by an
aggregate matching function H- ir(S,V ~, where S is the number of searchers and Y is the
number ofvacancies. H is increasing in both its arguments and exhibits constant returns to
scale. The number of searchers is given as the number of unemployed plus the effective
number of searchers on labour market programmes, i.e. S-[I f cR , where U and R are
the number of unemployed and the number of workers on programmes, respectively.
Search effectiveness is captured by the parameter c, where 0 S c ~ 1. Since being on a
programme is a full-time activity, programme participants search less intensively than the
unemployed. Notice in this model that all unemployed workers exhibit the same search
intensity. Thus we do not allow for the possibility that the unemployed may lower their
search intensity with duration of unemployment;. We further assume that those in regular
employment (!) do not search.
There are L individuals in the exogenously given labour force. The proportions of the
workforce in regular employment, on labour market programmes, and in unemployment
are given as e- E~L , r- R~L , and u - U~L , respectively. Since the labour force
comprises of those in regular employment, those on programmes, and those in
unemployment, we have the following identity: 1- e t r t u. The vacancy rate is given as
v- V~l. , The variable B- V~S represents labour market tightness. The higher is B, the
~ In othcr more-rcalislic models, wc do allow (or this possibilily. Here, however, wc usc tlris very simple
model to illustrate how rcjectable programmes can be used.
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tighter is the labour market. q- N~V represents the rate at which vacant jobs are filled.
By the constant returns to scale assumption, we have q(B~ - h(S~V ,l~ - h(]~8,1~, where
q'(B~ ~ 0. The flow of new hires into regular jobs is given as N- aS, where
a-(H~V~(V~,S~ - q(9~8. We see that a'(9~ ~ 0 since a - Ah(I~B,I~; thus a- h(1,8~ ,
where h(.~ is an increasing function.
Regular job offers arrive according to a Poisson process, with arrival rates that are
exogenous to the individual worker. The arrival rate for an unemployed worker is a,
whilst for a programme participant it is ca . Therefore, the amval rate is higher for an
unemployed searcher than for a programme participant, providing those on programmes
search less intensively than those in unemployment (i.e. if c ~ 1). The unemployed may
also exit to programmes. Offers of places on programmes arrive according to a Poisson
process with parameter y. There is an exogenously given rate ~ at which regular jobs
break up, and a government-deterrnined rate .i at which programmes expire. A worker
separated from a regular job can enter onto a labour market programme with probability
p, or enter directly into unemployment with probability ( 1 -~~ . Programmes are
considered to be temporary. Thus we assume that the rate at which programmes expire is







In Figure I, the boxes E, R, and 11, refer to the stocks of regular employment, programme
participants, and unemployment, respectively, whilst the arrows represent the flows
between the stocks. In the steady state, the numbers flowing into a given stock equal the
numbers flowing out of the said stock. Thus we have the following steady-state equations
for rates of regular employment and programme participation:
[I] ~e-a~B~u tca~B~~l-e-u~
[2] ~ca~9~ t .i~l - e - u~ - ri t ~~e
(From the identity 1- e t r f u, we let r- 1- e- u in the equations.)
Equations [ I] and [2] determine u and e, given B . In order to determine B, we have to
consider the determination of vacancies and wages. All rebular jobs are equally
productive. We assume that firms are small. Each firm has only one job which is either
occupied or vacant. For the firm, an occupied job has an expected value of Jo, if the
worker entered from a programme, and .I„~ if the worker entered from unemployment.
The expected value of a vacant job is J~. The discount rate is denoted by 8, y is the
constant marginal product, w~ is the wage cost to the firm of a worker who entered the
job from a programme, w~, is the wage cost to the firm of a worker who entered the job
from unemployment, and k is the cost of maintaining a vacancy. The wage rate is related
to the wage cost via the identity w~. r - w„~I t r~ , where I is the payroll tax. In this
paper, we treat the payroll tax as endogenous. How we do this will be explained in detail
in Section 4. . I„ ,.I ,~ , and .I~ satisfy the following equations:
[3] cSlo, - y- w t~J,. - Jo. ~
[4] `~ko. - y - w~. t ~J~ - J~. ~
[5] Sl,.--kty,~Jo,-J~~ty.~Jo,-~~
where y, - a~r and y~ - au.
v v
A job occupied by a worker who entered the wage bargain from a programme yields a
per-period surplus of y- w, and is turned into a vacant job at the rate ~; worker
separations from this job are associated with a capital loss of J~ - Ja . A job occupied by
a worker who entered the wage barbain from unemployment, on the other hand, yields a
per-period surplus of y-w~ and is turned into a vacant job at the rate ~; worker
separations from this job are associated with a capital loss of J~ - Jo. . The cost of a
vacancy per period is k, and vacancies become occupied at the rate q, by workers from
programmes and y, by workers from unemployment. Vacancies are kept open as long as
their yield is positive. In equilibrium, due to the small firm assumption, J, - 0. The value
of a job occupied by a worker who entered from a programme is obtained from [3] as
Jo, -(y - w, ),(8 t~) , whilst the value of a job occupied by a worker who entered from
unemployment is obtained from [4] as J-(y - w~. ),(8 t ~) . Substituting into [5]
yields
[6] y - w~. - k
S f ~ y(B)
where w~. -(nw~. f crw~ ),(u f cr) is the average wage cost in the economy, and
y(B) - y, t y, - a((cr t u)~v~ is the firm's average probability of finding a worker to fill
a vacancy.
This is the average zero-profit condition for firms. The left-hand side is the average
present value of profits per worker, whílst the right-hand side is the expected present
value of the firm's hiring cost. Labour market tightness influences decisions on vacancies
by affecting hiring costs; the tighter the labour market, the costlier it is to hire due to the
longer duration of vacancies.
8
Wages are determined by a Nash bargain. The firm's disagreement point is the value of a
vacant job; whilst the worker's threat point is either the expected lifetime value of being
unemployed, if the worker is unemployed, or the expected lifetime value of being on a
labour market programme, should the worker be on a programme. Since we assume that
the wage bargains are undertaken between individual firms and individual workers, there
are essentially two types ofNash bargain in the economy.
We let A, and A,~ denote expected discounted lifetime income for workers in regular
employment who have entered their job from a programme and workers who have entered
their job from unemployment, respectively. A, denotes the value ofunemployment, whilst
A, denotes the value of being on a programme. The value functions can be written as
[~] sn,, - w,, t (t - ~)~n, - n,, ~ f ~~(n, - n,~ )
[8] 8n,. - w, t(1 - ft)~(n, - n ,. ) t p~(A' - A'. )
[9] ~A, - P,w t ca(A, - A) t~.(A, - A,)
[]0] ~iA„ -P.wta(A,~ -A,~fy(A, -A~)
where A, -(1~8~w, t(1 - p)~n, - A, ~ t P~(A, - A, ~, is the value to the worker of
a job anywhere in the economy which was entered from a programme, whilst
A,. -(1~8~w„ t(1- P)~(A, - A,~ ~ t N~(A, - A,~ )] is the value of a job anywhere in
the economy which was entered from unemployment. w, and w~ refer to the wages of
workers in regular employment who entered the job from a programme and
unemployment respectively, whilst w refers to the average wage in the economy. A worker
employed by firm i receives the wage rate w,, if they entered the job from a programme,
and w, if they entered the job from unemployment. All workers are separated from their
job at the rate ~. A worker exiting from their job has probability P of entering a
programme and probability (I - P) of entering unemployment. Pay on programmes is
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linked to the average wage in the economy via the replacement ratio p„ whilst
unemployment benefits are linked to the average wa~e in the economy via the replacement
ratio p" .
The Nash bargain between a programme participant and the firm solves the following:
maxw" "1w~~-[A~~ lw~~~- A,~nf Jon (w,)-J,l~
v
where 0 ~~i ~ I. ` 1
The outcome of the Nash bargain is a wage equation of the form
[11~ w~.. -Y-LIa~~Itl~~~t~~~A~. -A~~
where the equilibrium conditions w, - w, and J~ - 0 are imposed. For these workers,
the outside option, should the wabe bargain not result in employment, is the value of being
on a programme, i.e. A,. As can be seen, any policy that reduces the value difference,
A, - A„ will increase w~.
The Nash bargain between an unemployed worker and the firm solves the following:
n ~-a
max„yS2~w")-[A`w~w"'~-A", [J"w~w")-J,,,
where 0 ~~i ~ I.
The outcome of the Nash bargain is a wage equation of the form
[12~ w~-, -Y-I I~~J~ItlxJt~~~Ae~ -A"~
where the equilibrLium conditions w" - w" and J~ - 0 are imposed. For these workers,
the outside option, should the wage bargain not result in employment, is the value of
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unemployment, i.e. A ~. Again, any policy that reduces the difference in value between
working and the outside option, A,. - A„ will increase the wage cost w~. .
We can combine these two wage equations to gain a wage-cost equation for the average
wage in the economy. By weighting w, by the proportion of searchers on programmes
and w, by the proportion of searchers in unemployment, we gain the following average
wage-cost equation:
uw~ f crw .









A, refers to the average value of being in regular employment, whilst A~ is simply the
average outside option available to workers involved in wage bargaining. (n [14], A, is
weighted by the proportion of effective searchers who are on programmes. This is due to
the fact that, in the steady state, the proportion of workers who enter regular employment
from programmes is equal to the proportion of effective searchers who are programme
participants. Similar reasoning holds for the weighting of A,~ .
We can re-write the average diftèrence in value between regular employment and the fall-
back situation as A, - A~, - f~.~w (see Appendix). Substituting this into [13] and using
[6] to eliminatey gives us the following equilibrium average wage equation:
~
[16] w` - ~l - ~~9~B~Í~a~e~~...~
tl
This equation determines the wage cost, given tightness. By expressing A, - Ap as the
average wage multíplied by f(.~, we are able to gain an explicit expression for w~ in
terms of ~i, k, q(B~, p„ p„ and the flow parameters of the model (see Appendix for
further details). Note that a is the only flow parameter which is a function of 6.
Our model is now more or less complete; in the next section, we complete the model by
making the budget constraint explicit. By seeing whether the system can provide all
workers with the guarantee of benefits or a wage at or above the social minimum, we can
see whether the system is workable or not.
The almost-complete model is given by the wage equation [1G], the zero-profit condition
[6], and the two steady-state equations [ I] and [2]. [6] and [ 16] determine B and w~ . By
substituting B into [ I] and [2], we can determine u and e.
The model is illustrated in Figure 2, below. The top half shows the zero-profit condition
[6] and the wage equation ( I G] in ~w~ , B~ - space. The bottom half shows the "Beveridge







Alternatively, we can show the model with the e-B curve, instead of the Beveridge
curve, as shown in Figure 3 below. The e-8 curve is simply the relationship between
regular employment and tightness. It is obtained by substituting out u from [1] and [2]. It





From Figures 2 and 3, it can be seen that the wage-setting curve slopes upwards. We can
see from [16] that B appears in the denominator in both y and the value difference. As B
increases, both q and J~-~ (which is positively related to the value difference) fall; the
result being that the average wage cost increases. The zero-profit condition on the other
hand is negatively sloped. The reason for this is that the higher the average wage, the
lower must be labour market tightness in order to yield zero profits (see Page 7).
The only curve which is unaffected by changes in any of the policy parameters is the zero-
profit condition in the top half of the diagrams. Changes in either of the replacement ratios
are reflected in a shift in the wage-setting curve, only. All other curves remain fixed. Thus
a change in a replacement ratio results in a movement along the zero-profit curve, and
thus movements along both the Beveridge curve and the e- B curve. A change in a policy
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parameter which directly affects the stocks in the labour market shifts the wage-setting
curve as well as the Beveridge curve and the e-B curve. An increase in the flow onto
labour market programmes causes the Beveridge curve and the e- B curve to shift
inwards towards the origin, and vice-versa.
As mentioned, whilst we are now in a position to see how the model looks, and what
happens if curves shift in a particular direction, we are unable to see if the resulting
equilibrium is able to offer all workers, whether working or not, the guarantee of either a
wage at or above the minimum acceptable level, or benefits at or above the minimum
acceptable level. The next section, therefore, shows how we have endogenised the payroll
tax and how this allows us to see whether the resulting situation is workable or not.
3 Endogenisation of tl~e payroll tax
In this paper, we endogenise the payroll tax. Whilst a change in the payroll tax does not
alter unemployment, or even regular employment, it is still necessary to look at the payroll
tax for other purposes. Primarily it is necessary to endogenise the payroll tax in order to
check to see if the situation is workable, in that the outcome is socially acceptable. What
this means is that the system is able to provide all workers outside of regular employment
with the option of either taking unemployment benefits or pay on a labour market
programme at or above the minimum level. (In an extreme situation, it may even be
possible that workers in regular employment have a wage below the required minimum!)
We assume that in the steady state, government revenue from the payroll tax equals
expenditure on both unemployment benefits and pay to those on labour market
programmes. Thus we have lwe - p,wr t p~wa. Simplification of this leaves us with the




From [ 16J, we see that w -~k,[~1 -(3~y~B~f ~a~B~;...~1 t t~, . Thus any increase in t will
reduce the wage, possibly to below the minimum level. (Note that we are discussing the
wage which the worker receives as opposed to the wage cost.) This itself, would ensure
that the system is unworkable. As is clear, [ is likely to increase should either p„ r, p,,,
or u increase or if e decreases. If any of these changes either reduces w to below the
minimum level, or the welfare safety net when not working (i.e. p,w when places on
labour market programmes are guaranteed to unemployed workers but their
unemployment benefits are below the minimum level; or p~w when no programmes are
available or when programmes are directed at the flow out of regular employment) to
below the minimum level, then we consider the system to be an unworkable system.
Our model is now complete. Figures 2 and 3 show the salient features of the model, whilst
the endogenisation of the payroll tax allows us to then check to see if an equilibrium is a
workable equilibrium or not. The next section looks at the comparative statics of the
model. This allows us to make predictions as to the likely direction ofchange in wages, as
well as the rates of regular employment, programme participation, and unemployment.
4 Comparative statics'
The direct effect on unemployment of a change in either y or p is ur ~ 0 and uN ~ 0,
respectively. In Figure 2, [his would be seen as an upward shift of the Beveridge curve.
Thus for a given value of B, unemployment will be lower. However, a change in a policy
parameter will also have an indirect wage effect on unemployment. This effect will alter
the value of B. As r~„ ~ 0, we would ideally like B to increase as a result of the change in
the policy parameter. Thus in Figure 2, we would prefer to see the wage curve shift
downwards, resulting in an increase in B. From [ IG], we see that any policy that increases
f reduces the wage cost. This has the effect of increasing B. Therefore, we see that a
" Calculations am bc sccn in tLc Appcndix.
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change in a policy parameter influences the wage (and B) according to the following
relationship:
sign (-I) ~ - sign~ - sign (-I) ~
where x is a policy parameter. Policies which have a negatíve indirect effect on
unemployment reinforce the direct negative effect on unemployment.
Since the value difference between regular employment and the fall-back position is
reduced when we increase p~ , it is clear that c~~r3p, ~ 0. Thus, if we can reduce p, , we
can increase J~~~ and thereby reduce the wage cost to firms. This in turn will increase the
value of B thus leading to an increased flow into regular employment. If we increase p, ,
the value difference between regular employment and the average fall-back situation can
either increase, decrease, or remain unchanged, depending on how programmes are
targeted. Thus we have éj`'~dp, -0.
If we increase the proportion of those exiting regular employment who enter labour
market programmes, this can either inerease, decrease, or leave unaltered, the value
difference between regular employment and the average fall-back position. The reason for
this is that whilst aiming programmes at the flow out of regular employment increases the
value of regular employment to a greater extent than the value of being in unemployment,
it also increases the value of being outside regular employment for some since it makes
them programme participants with a higher present value of lifetime income. Thus we have
c~~~-0. As a result, 9 can either increase, decrease, or remain unchanged with a
change in p .
Seeking to increase the number of unemployed workers entering labour market
programmes, i.e. increasing y, has the effect of increasing the present value of being in
unemployment to a greater extent than the increase in the present value of regular
employment. Coupled with this the fact that there are now more searchers on programmes
16
than previously, and thus with higlier present values, it is clear that the value difference
between regular employment and the average fall-back position will decrease. Thus we
have cj''~ay ~ 0. As a result, B will certainly decrease when programme places are
targeted at the unemployed.
With resard to regular employment, we find that the direct effect of an inerease of the
flow onto programmes is negative, i.e. we have er ~ 0 and e~ ~ 0. This, coupled with the
fact that eo ~ 0 and that an increase in programme participation may in fact reduce B,
implies that the usage of programmes is extremely likely to crowd out regular
employment.
The only policy which crowds in regular employment thereby reducing unemployment is
the policy of reducing unemployment benefits. Whílst there is no direct effect on the
labour market stocks, i.e. ~~~~3p,1~ ~- 0 and éii~~3p~~d-~ - 0, the indirect effect on
unemployment is unequivocally negative, and the indirect effect on regular employment is
unequivocally positive, i.e. ~~a~~~~~ó19~~3p~~ ~ 0 and ~c3r~á19~c~9~r7p,~ ~ 0. So what stops
us from using such a policy? Other papers have implicitly assumed that the level of
benefits is already at its minimum level. If we consider benefits to be at their minimum
level, the only way we can reduce them is to guarantee programmes to those who lose
such benefits. Yet by now using such programmes, we run the risk of crowding out
regular employment.
5 How to crowd in regular employment by using labour market programmes
As we have seen, the usage of labour market programmes is extremely likely to crowd out
regular employment. So if using programmes is almost certain to crowd out regular
employment, wouldn't it be undesirable to use them? Maybe; maybe not. Whilst so far the
picture with regard to the possibility of crowding out has been grim, there is a way in
which we can use labour market programmes and crowd in regular employment. One
thing is absolutely clear in the model: by reducing unemployment benefits we can reduce
unemployment and increase regular employment. So why don't we simply reduce
unemployment benefits? An obvious reason for not reducing unemployment benefits is
that they may already be at their minimum level. Since we have assumed that workers
must have the availability of a welfare safety net when outside regular employment, we
must consider the reduction of such benefits with caution. But couldn't we offer
unemployed workers places on programmes with a rate of pay at or above the minimum
level which are designed to give the worker a lower expected present value of lifetime
income than if the worker were in unemployment, despite the fact that unemployment
benefits are lower or possibly zero? By guaranteeing an unemployed worker a place on a
programme, but ensuring that the said job is rejectabte, we can cut unemployment benefits
to below their minimum level u~ul avoid the crowding out associated with the usage of
programmes. The welfare safety net is still in place, but the unemployed worker declines it
in favour of remaining unemployed with unemployment benefits below the minimum level.
In fact, an unemployed worker may opt to remain unemployed with no benefits
whatsoever, despite the fact that they are guaranteed a place on a programme!
How can this be so? Since an unemployed worker has a higher chance ofgaining a regular
job than a worker on a programme (providing that c~ I), it may be in the interest of the
worker to remain unemployed, foregoing earnings from programme participation, to
maintain a maximum chance of gaining a regular job. The worker can thus achieve the
highest expected lifetime income by remaining unemployed, and waiting until a regular job
is obtained, despite the fact that unemployment benefits may be well below the socially
acceptable minimum.
Essentially the result of this policy is two-fold: Firstly, the reductiun in unemployment
benefits increases the value difference between regular employment and unemployment,
thus leading to a lower wage cost to firms. Lower wage costs induce firms to create more
vacancies. As a result, B increases which in turn causes a, the tlow into regular
employment, to increase. Secondly, it avoids unemployed workers, with a maximum
Is
search intensity, from entering programmes where the search intensity is very likely to be
lower (i.e., when c ~ 1), due to having less time to search than if they remained in
unemployment. Since the worker would rather be unemployed than on a programme,
providing the lifetime income of being unemployed is lligher than if they took a place on a
programme, they choose unemployment so that they are able to search full time for regular
employment.
Despite the fact that the policy solution which we offer has unequivocal results, it is
enlightening to look at examples of such usage, particularly in relation to the use of
programmes where the intention is that they be accepted, i.e. "acceptable" programmes.
The following table shows some simulations undertaken which show the contrast between
using rejectable and acceptable labour market programmes. The parameter values which
we use are the same as those used by Holmlund 8c Lindén.
Table 1
Y ~ P„ P, u r e v B w t w~. AIR wo.t,blesyalnn7
n.,~
run
o.o 0 o s s.o o.0 9s.o 2 0 o.i9 Iwl.o 2.G uxl.o
-
,~
c-0 0.5 0 I1.0 I.II 1.2 92.2 G.G 01 U.Ut 7.U I191.G 101.4 A X
c-U 00 0 0.0 0.491 3.3 U ')G.7 2J U-NU IULN 0 9'1.22 ,~ ~
r-0.S 0.5 0 0,0 QSU7 0.2 G.2 ')3.G 2.3 0.7( 7N.6 3.4 9').29 A ~
c-0.3 0.U U 0.023 U.491 7.4 U ')G( 2.6 U.7N IOLN 0.1 99.23 j~ ~
c-1 0.5 U 0.0 0.5 0.2 4.R 93.p 2.0 0.40 100.1 2.5 9299 A ~
c-0 0.0 1 0.333 0.973 4.N 9.4 N3.3 1.7 U 13 7U.0 14.1 100.1 A ~
c-U.S U.0
~















.--. -------. .---..-. - -- . ~ - . ~ .u ~~ ,3
lhe followiug puramclcr vulue~s hold in Ihe Inble: x- I,I50; ~- 11.00075; 6- 0.05,3G5 ; and (J - OS46. u, r, e,
mld v all rcfcr lo pcrcxnlages of thc IabUUi roru:. w aud w arc giv71 as indius with 6oU1 llt:ing ~t a.qual l0 100 in
c
Wc base nm. t rcfcrs lo lhe percenWge rnle o( payroll L1x. Followi0g tlolmlund ~R. Lindt.til, we define lhe cost oC
maintaining 0 vacancy k, as k- w , und lhe uverage probubilily of u firm lilling u vocancy as r~ - 0.025~ B-0'4 .
c
In Table 1, the base run describes the initial situation when labour market programmes are
not available and the level of unemployment benefits is already at the minimum possible
level. We consider this minimum level to be the absolute level of unemployment benefits in
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the base run. The second column from the right, "A~Il", indicates whether programmes are
acceptable (indicated by A) or rejectable (indicated by R). The cotumn on the far right
indicates whether the system is workable or not (a tick indicates yes; a cross indicates no).
By workability, we refer to whether the system can maintain a welfare safety net at or
above the minimum level (here, the safety net which was in force in the base run). This is
where the endogenisation of the payroll tax comes into force. By using the definition of
the payroll tax, we can see whether the system can support the welfare safety net required.
Table I shows us the average wage (as opposed to the wage cost) which the worker
receives in regular employment. As is clearly seen, this wage is reduced by an increase in
the payroll tax. In one case, the wage is itself reduced below the minimum level of
absolute benefit required in the base run! The following table shows us why, and if, the
system is workable.
Table 2
Y N P~ P. P~w P,W w,,.(:al,l~T A~ Ae A AY
ISaserun U.(1 U 0.5 - 50.0 - r - 77871G.5 7G7535.9 775103.4
c~ u.s o n.o I.u o.o zu „ ,q 55111.2 ssolG.s ssooz.a
c~ 0.0 11 0.11 (1.49 11.11 SU.(1 r It 78G313.8 773724.1 781418.8
c~.5 11.5 11 O.U 11.51 11.11 i011 r A 7G1751.4 757114.1 757103.3
c~1.5 11,(1 0 11.113 (14'1 2.5 5(1.11 r I( 78G1((r9 7813112.1 781319.U
c-1 0.5 0 U.0 OS U.11 50.11 r A 778933.1 775300.3 775194.0
c-0 O.U I O.SG 0 98 50.11 87-8 r A 702214.1 G99152.5 699114.5
c~S.S (1.0 I (1.51 0.75 50.0 73.(1 ~ f] 758469.2 755036.8 754961.4
c-1 (1.11 I 0.5 U.51 SO.U 50.0 r A 778595.2 775018.0 774944.3
As shown, acceptability may be just too expensive to maintain. For example, when c- 0
and labour market programmes are targeted at the unemployed (row 2, Tables I and 2),
we find that acceptability requires that the average wage that the worker in regular
employment receives falls heavily due to the need to finance labour market programmes.
In fact, it falls far below the minimum level of benefits required! When c- 0 and we
target programmes at the flow out of regular employment, we must still maintain
unemployment benefits at or above the minimum absolute level since we are not
guaranteeing unemployed workcrs a place on a programme. However, to do so requires a
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high replacement ratio for those on programmes which itself reduces regular employment
(which, as can be seen from Table I, has already been crowded out as a result of this
policy) still further.
In our simulations the only time when using acceptable programmes works, i.e. fails to
crowd out regular employment, is when c- 1. But in the simulation when ~- 1, the
value functions for both being on a programme and being in unemployment are the same
value. Using the benefit of doubt, we have allowed this to be considered as a usage of
acceptable programmes. But to really be certain of this we really require an explicit form
for the worker's utility function. So this situation must be considered doubtful. In any
case, c- 1.0 is an extreme example and does not appear to be indicative of the real world.
In the simulations where acceptability ofprogrammes holds and where c ~ l, we see from
Table 1 that some crowding out of regular employment results. The extreme case is the
simulation illustrated in row 2 ofTables 1 and 2. The regular employment rate is reduced
from 95"~o to a mere 6.6"~0. As can be seen, this situation is unworkable. In row 4 of
Tables 1 and 2, we see the result of a simulation where c - 0.5 and acceptability holds.
Here, the regular employment rate has fallen from 950~o to 93.6"~0. Not a substantial level
of crowding out, but crowding out nonetheless. When we guarantee places on
programmes to those flowing out of regular employment ( rows 7, 8, and 9, in Tables 1
and 2), we see that when c ~ I and acceptability holds, crowding out is again the result.
Looking at the present value of expected lifetime income of being either employed in a
regular job, on a programme, or in unemployment, in Table 2, we see that the only time
when lifetime income rises substantially as a result ofa policy change is when the resulting
situation includes rejectable labour market programmes. This is in stark contrast to
situations where c ~ 1 and acceptability holds: lifetime income falls for all groups.
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6 Conclusion
As can be seen, the only usage of Iabour market programmes which enables us to crowd in
regular employment in this model, is that of rejectable labour market programmes. By
offering unemployed workers programmes which they reject in favour of remaining
unemployed, on reduced benefits due to their refusal of an offer of a place on a
programme, we are able to shift the wage-setting curve downwards resulting in an
increase of the flow into regular employment. Despite the fact that we now offer workers
unemployment benefits below the minimum level, the welfare safety net is still in place.
Workers do not have to face the prospect of poverty. Workers, seeing that ít is in their
interest to remain (or become) unemployed, rather than to join a labour market
programme, will take the appropriate action when employed' and plan for any possible
periods when unemployed. Indecd, both the rejectable programme solutions increase the
expected lifetime income of those in unemployment in comparison to those in
unemployment in the base run. Furthermore, the rejectable programme solutions also
increase the lifetime incomes of those in regular employment in comparison to those in
regular employment in the base run (see Table 2 for details).
Thus the only method of programme usage which leads to a crowding in of regular
employment, is that usage which itself is dormant but allows for a tightening of the
unemployment benefit system. This tightening of the unemployment benefit system is the
only way to crowd in regular employment. To guarantee a crowding in of regular
employment, labour market programmes must be used in such a way that their direct
effect on employment and unemployment is non-operational and only their quasi-indirect
effect, through reducing unemployment benefits, is operational.
`[n thc shon-run, i.c. bclwccn [t~c slcady-st:uc sohnions, it may wcll bc thc casc thal workers wilt take
pl.~ccs on I:~bour markct progranuucs duc lo bcing liquiditycons[raincd. An analysis of the dynamics
betwccn thc stcady slatcs is on our agcnda.
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8 Appendix
From equations ( 1) and (2), and the identity I- e t r t u, we gain the following steady-
state equations for regular employment, labour market programmes, and unemployment:
a~cat cy f.ï~
[AI] e-
~(ca f ft~ t .ïx I - c~a t(ca f ~Xca t y t.ï~~
~ca~l - p~ t .i~ A
~c-~l-c~a{~~ta~catcyf.i~t~catyt~~-V
IA3] r - ~y } pa) - ~~I-c~aN~ta~catcyfci~t~(cafyt~.~-V
Differentiating [AI] with respect to yand ~t, we find that
~
aY







These differentials refer to the direcl effect of a policy change, i.e. the effect of a policy
change on regular employmeni when 9 is fixed. Notice that p, does not appear in the
steady-state value of regular employment. Thus the direct




effect of a change in p~
Differentiating [A I] with respect to a, we gain the following:
~ -ca'p~l-c~t~yt.íXcatcyt~.~tca~catyt~.~i0
~ ~(ca t N~ f .ixl - c~a t~ca t~~ca t y f~.~~2









~ 0-9 -- v ~B-.q v
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Similar to regular employment we find that a change in p, does not have a direct effect
on unemployment: ~ - 0.
~. .-s
Differentiating [A2] with respect to a, we gain the following:
a ~ [c {~. - (1- ~r)~} t c'a' (I - ~r) t .i(ca t ~r4 t ~.)] ~ oáY--vi r
Since a'(9) ~ 0, this implies that a~o
c~
We find the avera~e value difference between regular employment and the fall-back
position as follows:
uA, t crA uA, t crA,[A4] A, - A~ - ' -
utcr utcr
~ca( I - p) t ~i JIA,. - A, ) t ~r t ~a~A~, - A')[AS] A, - A~, -
catcrt~,
[A6] A, - A~ - A, -
uA, tcrA, - u(A, - A„)tcr(A, - A,)
utcr crtu
We invoke the followin8 equations:
rSd1,, - w, t(I - Et~~(A, - A,, ) t ft~(A, - A, ),
bA'M - w` t(I - p~~A' - A,~, ) t p~lA' - A' ),
sn, -~,wt~a(n,, -n,~t~(n, -n,)
sn , - P„w t a(A,. - A„) t y(A, - A„)
lnvoking the equilibrium condition that w, - w, and w, - w, , and subtracting (8) from
(7) yields the followin8:
w, - w, - (S t ~)(A, - A,~ ~
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Subtracting ( I 2) from ( I 1) yields the following:
(11)-(12)~ [A~] w,-w,-f I~Q~(at~)~(n,.-n,)-(n,,-n,)~
Together these imply the following:
A~, -A.. -(t-i)A, t(1-Q)A. -~
The identity which gives us the average present value to the worker of being in regular
employment ( I4) implies the following:
[A8] ~ca t cy t~.)A, - c{y t Na)A, -~ca~l - N)t.i~A,~ - 0
Using [A7], [A8], and the following equations
~S t~)A, - w t~1- N)~A. t N~.
~ótcat~)A, -P,wtcaA, t.iA„
~SfatY)A. -P.wtaA., }YA.
allows us to find explicit expressions for A, - A„ and A, - A, .
We let A, - A, -~ and A, - A, -~
where
V-~S t~)Z - p~a~ca t cy t.ï)S~1 - c) t a~c~y t a~3) t 8 t .ï~
Z- ca{ca~l - N) t~,}~I -~xh t a) t.i{~ca t cy t.1)y - ca~y f Na)~l - Q)}
t~S t ca t Á){ca~y t fiaxl - ~ï) -~St a t y~ca t cy t.i)}
A-~ca~l-N)t.1~S~ca~3t.ltSty)tc~yt,ua)S~StytaQtcat.~-a)
t N~4' t-~ t~l - f~)~1- ~8 t~)~
and
~- P,c~y f NaXS t y f aQ) t P,~S t y)~ca~l - ~i) t .i~
-- caiiP, ~ca~ l- fi) t .i~ t ~iPw ~ca t cy t~)- acQ~y t f~aXP, - c'P. )
N- P, ~ca f c.y t~i)y t ca~fQ~~y t fta)P, ~{ ca~l -{i) t .i~p,]- ca~Y t Na)P,
t~8 t~.)P,~ca t cy t.i) t cap,c~y f pa)
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~--ca~ca(I - fi~ t.i~P, (I - fl~ t(S t ca t ~.~P,~(ca t cy t.i~
- P, { cu'~(Y t Eia~ - y~(ca t cy t~~}
B-~ca( I - f~~ t~~c5~ca~i t.i t d t y t( I- c~a~ t c~(y t Pa~B(St y t a~3 t .i~
t(I -~r~~~(ca t cy t.i~(P„ - P. ~
t{rA írrr~(r f fru~(d t r f u~f~ t lV r~~ } r ~ t u(Vr - r~{'u ~ t r~Vu }~ru(~ -{r~ } ~] t~Vu~ca t cy t d~~
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